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19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
20 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

21 EMPLOYEE HEALTH SYSTEMS
22 MEDICAL GROUP, INC., a California
23 Corporation

24 Case No. 2:18-cv-10587 GW(JPRx)

25 **PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR STAY FILED
ON FEBRUARY 22, 2019**

26 Plaintiff,

27 vs.

28 DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED
29 HEALTH CARE, SHELLY
30 ROUILLD, AND DOES 1-50

31 Defendants.

32 Plaintiff Employee Health Systems Medical Group, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "EHS"),
33 hereby opposes the ex parte application for and motion for stay filed by Defendants on
34 February 22, 2019, on the following grounds.

35 **INTRODUCTION**

36 Defendants' ex parte application for stay should be denied for several procedural
37 and substantive reasons. One, Defendants failed to meet and confer before filing their

1 application. Two, no basis for ex parte relief exists. Three, there is no substantive
 2 basis for the motion, only Defendants' own lack of diligence in filing a responsive
 3 pleading. Four, the Motion is incoherent invoking the Court's own power to bootstrap
 4 a purported and ad hominem contention that Plaintiff might somehow evade the
 5 Court's very authority. Five, the application, filed on a Friday afternoon, without
 6 substantive meet and confer and partially under seal, is an attempt to annoy, DELAY
 7 and harass Plaintiff, warranting the imposition of sanctions.

8 **ARGUMENT**

9 **A. Defendants' Application is procedurally defective**

10 Defendants' ex parte application is procedurally deficient and should be
 11 dismissed outright.

12 i. Defendants failed to substantively meet and confer re the substance of their
 13 application.

14 Local Rule 7-19.1 requires an attorney to orally advise opposing counsel of the
 15 date, if known, and the substance of the ex parte application. Here, Plaintiff failed to
 16 meet the good faith requirements of Local Rule 7-19.1. Here, Defendants' counsel on
 17 a Friday afternoon, sent a vague email purporting to notify Plaintiff's counsel of the
 18 application, concurrent with the ECF filing of the Application. See, Michael
 19 MClelland Declaration in Opposition. ¶2. The email provides no substantive
 20 description of the Application or its basis, nor any opportunity to meet and confer re
 21 same. No oral communications were had, nor even attempted. See, Local Rule 7-
 22 19.1. Further, merely sending an opaque email concurrent with the filing of the
 23 application is certainly not a "good-faith" meet and confer as required by Local Rule
 24 7-19.1.

25 ii. Ex parte relief is unwarranted.

26 Defendants' basis for their motion for stay is apparently their conjecture based
 27 on ad hominem and straw man arguments, that Plaintiff might do something before
 28 Defendants file a purported motion to dismiss. This is legally incorrect and insufficient

1 for many reasons. First, to obtain ex parte relief, Defendants must be “without fault in
 2 creating the crisis that requires ex parte relief, or that the crisis occurred as a result of
 3 excusable neglect.” E.g., *Mission Power Eng'g Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co.*, 883 F. Supp.
 4 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Importantly, no stay is necessary as Defendants could have
 5 filed any responsive pleading at any time since they waived service of process on
 6 January 7, 2019. Dckt #11. Thus, other than Defendants’ own lack of diligence, there
 7 exists no basis for ex pt relief. Accordingly, Defendants’ role in creating the situation
 8 requiring relief precludes their application. *Mission Power Eng'g Co.*, supra. Finally,
 9 the Application asks this Court to presuppose the merits of a purported motion to
 10 dismiss, one which Plaintiff would certainly oppose. This is inappropriate and
 11 unsupported. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide the procedures by
 12 which a party may answer or challenge the pleadings and these Defendants are not
 13 entitled to special dispensation from the well-established Rules.

14 **B. No Basis Exists for Stay**

15 Not only are Defendants’ arguments procedurally unsupported and
 16 unpersuasive, they are simply untrue, an amalgam of bad-faith ad hominem and
 17 strawman fallacies. Defendants’ again are asking this Court to presuppose the merits
 18 of their purported motion to dismiss, but their contentions are false.

19 Plaintiff has no intent to dismiss its claims in this tribunal; Plaintiff has pled
 20 cognizable claims and sees a trial on each claim stated. It is correct that Plaintiff
 21 initially pled its claims challenging the constitutionality and lawfulness of the
 22 Defendants’ actions in this Court. However, Plaintiff also had various state law claims
 23 for damages it wished to assert; claims which the federal courts are barred from hearing
 24 under the 11th Amendment. See, McClelland Decl. ¶3. Those state law claims were
 25 thus alleged in a separate Superior Court proceeding. Id. Defendants’ raised immunity
 26 arguments in that proceeding as a defense to the claims alleged. Id. Thus, Defendant
 27 Rouillard conceded the “acting under color of authority” element of Plaintiff’s Section
 28 1983 claim. For this and other reasons, Plaintiff dismissed its state law claims and

1 filed the instant action which concerns predominantly federal issues, e.g., Section 1983
 2 and the constitutionality of Defendants' actions. Id. Plaintiff has no reason to evade
 3 any rulings and in fact seeks adjudication of all of its claims filed in its Complaint as
 4 expeditiously as possible.

5 Finally, Defendants' argument is internally contradictory. Defendants' argue
 6 that because Plaintiff might take some action to evade the Court's ruling, the Court
 7 should rule on its Application. This turns the law on its head. The Court clearly has
 8 jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and can adjudicate all issues through the normal
 9 procedures. Indeed, the best remedy for Defendants' purported interest in finality, is
 10 for Defendants to answer the Complaint, and to try this matter on the merits.

11 Wherefore Defendants' Application, both procedurally deficient and without
 12 substantive basis, should be denied.

13 SANCTIONS

14 Defendant's Application should be denied and sanctions imposed. Defendants
 15 failed to meet the good-faith meet and confer requirement in Local Rule 7-19.1 in the
 16 context of filing its application on a Friday afternoon knowing that Defendants would
 17 only have the weekend to prepare opposition. Further, Defendants in no way make the
 18 showing required under *Mission Power Eng'g Co*, supra, and the Application was
 19 therefore nakedly baseless. This is a bad faith abuse of the ex parte application process
 20 for which the Court should award sanctions to Plaintiff. Plaintiff requests \$3,300 for
 21 opposing this Application and requests a like amount to be imposed on Defendants to
 22 deter further misuse of the ex parte process. McClelland Declaration ¶4.

23 DATED: February 25, 2019

KENNADAY LEAVITT OWENSBY PC

24 By: /s/ Michael D. McClelland
 25 MICHAEL D. McCLELLAND
 26 Attorneys for Plaintiff
 27 EMPLOYEE HEALTH SYSTEMS
 28 MEDICAL GROUP, INC.